In recent years, artificial intelligence has grown notably in its technical capacity and in its prominence in our society. 15. Despite the large number of variables addressed in this paper, this is at its core a simple theory with the aims of motivating additional analysis and research to branch off. What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. The coincident timing of high-profile talks with a leaked report that President Trump seeks to reduce troop levels by half has already triggered a political frenzy in Kabul. In their paper, the authors suggest Both the game that underlies an arms race and the conditions under which it is conducted can dramatically affect the success of any strategy designed to end it[58]. Is human security a useful approach to security? In this example, each player has a dominantstrategy. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 Put another way, the development of AI under international racing dynamics could be compared to two countries racing to finish a nuclear bomb if the actual development of the bomb (and not just its use) could result in unintended, catastrophic consequences. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. [22] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, ProPublica, May 23, 2016 https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. In a case with a random group of people, most would choose not to trust strangers with their success. However, the interest of the state has continued to overshadow the interest of the people. Finally, a Stag Hunt occurs when the returns for both actors are higher if they cooperate than if either or both defect. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> > Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. We can see through studying the Stag Hunt game theory that, even though we are selfish, we still are ironically aiming to for mutual benefit, and thus we tend to follow a such a social contract. Table 4. Two, three, four hours pass, with no trace. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. I introduce the example of the Stag Hunt Gamea short, effective, and easy-to-use activity that simulates Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy. One is the coordination of slime molds. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. A sudden drop in current troop levels will likely trigger a series of responses that undermine the very peace and stability the United States hopes to achieve. [26] Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, Frank Wilczek, Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence but are we taking AI seriously enough? The Indepndent, May 1, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html. In the Prisoner's dilemma, defect is a dominant strategy and only the bad outcome is possible. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. Actor As preference order: DC > CC > CD > DD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DC > DD. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. For example, if the players could flip a coin before choosing their strategies, they might agree to correlate their strategies based on the coin flip by, say, choosing ballet in the event of heads and prize fight in the event of tails. And, seeing how successful the stag hunters are, most hare hunters will convert to stag hunters. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? Why do trade agreements even exist? In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? In the current Afghan context, the role of the U.S. military is not that of third-party peacekeeper, required to guarantee the peace in disinterested terms; it has the arguably less burdensome job of sticking around as one of several self-interested hunters, all of whom must stay in the game or risk its collapse. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. Here, both actors demonstrate varying uncertainty about whether they will develop a beneficial or harmful AI alone, but they both equally perceive the potential benefits of AI to be greater than the potential harms. Table 13. As of 2017, there were 193 member-states of the international system as recognized by the United Nations. In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 2 games including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. the primary actors in war, having been replaced by "group[s] identified in terms of ethnicity, religion, or tribe" and that such forces rarely fight each other in a decisive encounter. 0000006962 00000 n Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. to Be Made in China by 2030, The New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, [33] Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence., [34] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier.. At the same time, a growing literature has illuminated the risk that developing AI has of leading to global catastrophe[4] and further pointed out the effect that racing dynamics has on exacerbating this risk. Table 3. As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. They suggest that new weapons (or systems) that derive from radical technological breakthroughs can render a first strike more attractive, whereas basic arms buildups provide deterrence against a first strike. See Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang, & Owain Evans, When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 14. Some have accused rivals of being Taliban sympathizers while others have condemned their counterparts for being against peace. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. [46] Charles Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, International Security 19, 3(1994): 50-90. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. Downs et al. Course blog for INFO 2040/CS 2850/Econ 2040/SOC 2090, Link: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. The best response correspondences are pictured here. Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. The theory outlined in this paper looks at just this and will be expanded upon in the following subsection. 1 The metaphors that populate game theory modelsimages such as prisoners . The area of international relations theory that is most characterized by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory.Although the imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were outgrowths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually are to be found in the area of mathematics. Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. Rabbits come in the form of different opportunities for short-term gain by way of graft, electoral fraud, and the threat or use of force. Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. Donna Franks, an accountant for Southern Technologies Corporation, discovers that her supervisor, Elise Silverton, made several errors last year. Overall, the errors overstated the companys net income by 40%. I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. Here, we have the formation of a modest social contract. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Similar strategic analyses can be done on variables and variable relationships outlined in this model. This essay first appeared in the Acheson Prize 2018 Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies. In the context of international relations, this model has been used to describe preferences of actors when deciding to enter an arms treaty or not. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. They are the only body responsible for their own protection. One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People are Socially Late. Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. .more Dislike Share Noah Zerbe 6.48K subscribers [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. For example, Jervis highlights the distinguishability of offensive-defensive postures as a factor in stability. In this book, you will make an introduction to realism, liberalism and economic structuralism as major traditions in the field, their historical evolution and some theories they have given birth . [30] Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Report for Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf: 71-110. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a game in Deadlock. The first technology revolution caused World War I. How do strategies of non-violent resistance view power differently from conventional 'monolithic' understandings of power? If both sides cooperate in an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that each actor believes such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI expressed as P_(b|A) (AB)for Actor As belief and P_(b|B) (AB)for Actor B times each actors perceived benefit of AI expressed as bA and bB. But, at various critical junctures, including the countrys highly contentious presidential elections in 2009 and 2014, rivals have ultimately opted to stick with the state rather than contest it. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. Different social/cultural systems are prone to clash. Some observers argue that a precipitous American retreat will leave the countryand even the capital, Kabulvulnerable to an emboldened, undeterred Taliban given the limited capabilities of Afghanistans national security forces. 714 0 obj Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of both the likelihood that the actor themselves will develop a harmful AI times that harm, as well as the expected harm of their opponent developing a harmful AI. If, by contrast, the prospect of a return to anarchy looms, trust erodes and short-sighted self-interest wins the day. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . If a hunter leaps out and kills the hare, he will eat, but the trap laid for the stag will be wasted and the other hunters will starve. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. [13] Tesla Inc., Autopilot, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? International Relations, [35] Outlining what this Coordination Regime might look like could be the topic of future research, although potential desiderata could include legitimacy, neutrality, accountability, and technical capacity; see Allan Dafoe, Cooperation, Legitimacy, and Governance in AI Development, Working Paper (2016). The stag hunters are likely to interact with other stag hunters to seek mutual benefit, while hare hunters rarely care with whom they interact with since they rather not depend on others for success. trailer which can be viewed through the lens of the stag hunt in for an example the countrys only international conference in International Relations from, Scenario Assurance game is a generic name for the game more commonly known as Stag Hunt. The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presented the following [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. Image: The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division at the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The hedge is shared so both parties are responsible for maintaining it. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. Payoff matrix for simulated Deadlock. The second technology revolution caused World War II. The reason is because the traditional PD game does not fully capture the strategic options and considerations available to each player. [43] Edward Moore Geist, Its already too late to stop the AI arms race We must manage it instead, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 5(2016): 318321. Most prominently addressed in Nick Bostroms Superintelligence, the creation of an artificial superintelligence (ASI)[24] requires exceptional care and safety measures to avoid developing an ASI whose misaligned values and capacity can result in existential risks for mankind. [14] IBM, Deep Blue, Icons of Progress, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/. What is the 'New Barbarism' view of contemporary conflicts? The matrix above provides one example. endobj If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. Solving this problem requires more understanding of its dynamics and strategic implications before hacking at it with policy solutions. In international relations, countries are the participants in the stag hunt. I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. When there is a strong leader present, players are likely to hunt the animal the leader chooses. N-person stag hunt dilemmas Jorge M. Pachecol'*, Francisco C. Santos2, Max O. Souza3 and Brian Skyrms4 . For example, it is unlikely that even the actor themselves will be able to effectively quantify their perception of capacity, riskiness, magnitude of risk, or magnitude of benefits. Read about me, or email me. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. The 18th century political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously described a dilemma that arises when a group of hunters sets out in search of a stag: To catch the prized male deer, they must cooperate, waiting quietly in the woods for its arrival. (lljhrpc). A classic game theoretic allegory best demonstrates the various incentives at stake for the United States and Afghan political elites at this moment. Within the arms race literature, scholars have distinguished between types of arms races depending on the nature of arming. Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. Table 2. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. This could be achieved through signaling lack of effort to increase an actors military capacity (perhaps by domestic bans on AI weapon development, for example). The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. This distribution variable is expressed in the model as d, where differing effects of distribution are expressed for Actors A and B as dA and dB respectively.[54]. They will be tempted to use the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban and the upcoming election season to score quick points at their rivals expense, foregoing the kinds of political cooperation that have held the country together until now. [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. A major terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan would represent a kind of equal opportunity disaster and should make a commitment to establishing and preserving a capable state of ultimate value to all involved. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. At key moments, the cooperation among Afghan politicians has been maintained with a persuasive nudge from U.S. diplomats. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. What should Franks do? Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. Explain how the 'Responsibility to Protect' norm tries to provide a compromise between the UN Charter's principle of non-interference (state sovereignty) and the UN genocide convention. ? This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. It is also the case that some human interactions that seem like prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be stag hunts. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. [47] look at different policy responses to arms race de-escalation and find that the model or game that underlies an arms race can affect the success of policies or strategies to mitigate or end the race.